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Recent South African Labor Legislation: 
Assessing the New Rights of Black Workers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In early November of 1984, 800,000 black workers in South Africa joined in 
a two day political strike to protest rent increases and poor educational oppor-
tunities. 1 The strike, organized by political groups, student organizations, and 
black trade unions, was the largest in South African history, and shut down 
much of the industry in parts of the nation." The work stoppage shut down 
fifty percent of the factories in Pretoria, Johannesburg, and in industrial towns 
east of Johannesburg; it was ninety percent effective in certain areas south of 
Johannesburg.:l Violent clashes with police led to sixteen deaths.' The govern-
ment responded by detaining a number of union leaders without charges, 
including Chris D1amini, the General-Secretary of the Federation of South 
African Trade Unions, and Phiroshaw Camay, the General-Secretary of the 
Council of Unions of South Africa.' 
This incident illustrates the difficulties faced by the black union movement 
in South Africa. Although recently enacted legislation endows blacks and their 
labor unions with more legal rights than ever before, it nonetheless prescribes 
confines within which the union movement must operate." However, the lev-
erage gained by these unions subsequent to the passage of the legislation may 
make it difficult, if not impossible, for such legislation to be repealed. The 
legislation, which was born out of a desire to control the black labor force, has 
proved to be a springboard from which the blacks can potentially gain even 
greater power. 
This Comment, while concentrating primarily upon the legal development of 
black unionism through recent legislation, will place this movement in the larger 
context of the general South African labor environment. Specifically, this Com-
ment will first present an overview of the history of black labor in this century. 
I Russell, Railing Against Ra(ism, TIME, Dec. 24, 1984, at 23; Boesak: "1 Refuse to Give Up Hope", 
AFRICA NEWS, Nov. 19, 1984, at 7. 
2 AFRICA NEWS, supra note I, at 7. 
3 Boston Globe, Nov. 7, 1984, at 42, col. 4. 
'Id. 
S Christian Science Monitor, "Iov. 16, 1984, at 14, col. I. South Africa's three major national business 
organizations, the Federated Chamber of Industries, the Afrikaanese Handelsinstitute, and the South 
African Chambers of Commerce, took the unusual step of criticizing the government for the deten-
tions.ld. Chris Dlamini has subsequently been released. Boston Globe, Jan. 21, 1985, at 19, col. I. 
6 See infra notes 140-339 and accompanying text (discussing this recent legislation). 
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The Comment will then examine current black labor conditions in South Africa 
as affected by U.S. policies and other international actions. Within this broad 
context, the author will discuss the recent legislative changes affecting the black 
labor unions. Finally, this Comment will assess the effects of this legislation on 
the scope of political activism, the recent growth of the union movement, the 
special case of the mining industry, and the factors affecting the potential success 
of black unions in South Africa. 
II. HISTORY OF THE BLACK TRADE UNION MOVEMENT 
Although South Africa abolished slavery as early as 1834,7 much of the 
nation's early industrial growth was spurred by the employment of large num-
bers of unskilled black workers at relatively low wages.s This economic oppres-
sion, coupled with pervasive state regulation, has historically relegated black 
labor unions to a position of instability and weakness. 9 
Although there had been unions and ineffective general strikes previously, JO 
the first black union of any significance, the Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union (ICU), was formed in 1918. 11 The ICU had some recruiting success and 
boasted over 100,000 members in the late 1920s.12 Like other early unions, 
however, the ICU soon dissolved as a result of disorganization, employer hos-
tility, and internal division. 13 
These early unions gained no real power, and the Rand Revolt of 1922 further 
undermined the position of black labor. The Rand Revolt occurred when white 
workers in the Rand area became concerned as mine operators began to fill 
available jobs with cheaper black labor. 14 As tensions mounted, a white coal 
7 Lansing, The Divestment of United States Companies in South Africa and Apartheid, 60 NEB. L. REV. 304 
(1981). For a summary of the emancipation movement in South Africa, see 2 M. WILSON & L. 
THOMPSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 305-09 (1971). 
8 Gould, Black Unions in South Africa: Labor Law Reform and Apartheid, 17 STAN. J. INT'L L. 99, 100-
01 (1981). 
9 See G. CARTER, WHICH WAY IS SOLTH AFRICA GOING? 95-96 (1980). White labor unions have also 
been relatively weak in South Africa. South African labor law has always been very restrictive as 
compared to that of the United States or Great Britain. This is evidenced by South Africa's compulsory 
conciliation, lengthy cooling-off periods, and common law provisions permitting employers to dismiss 
workers for obstructionism even if they are engaged in a legal strike. Id. at 96. There has never been 
any legislation in South Africa, however, banning black trade unions. See H. RINGROSE, THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF EMPLOYMENT 6 (2d ed. 1983). 
III Gould, supra note 8, at 10!. General strikes occured in 1911, 1913, 1914, and 1919. Id. 
IIId. at 102; Gould, Are Black Unions the Key?, COMMONWEAL, Nov. 10, 1978, at 718. 
12 Gould, supra note 8, at 102. 
13 !d. at 102-03. The South African Federation of Non-European Trade Unions met a similar fate 
in the early 1930s. ld. at 103. See also Lacob, The Rising Tide of Black Unionism, THE NATION, Dec. 25, 
1982, at 684. 
14 Bonacich, Capitalism and Race Relations in South Africa: A Split Labor Market Analysis, POLITICAL 
POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY, 1981, at 239, 254. 
1986] SOUTH AFRICAN LABOR LEGISLATION 165 
miners' strike spread to the gold mines; soon the entire Rand area was in-
volved.!5 The government responded by invoking martial law.!6 Ensuing vio-
lence led to 247 deaths and 591 injuries. 17 Eighteen strikers were convicted of 
murder and sentenced to death.!S After the Rand Revolt, the government 
passed a series of new laws to protect white labor.!9 
In the 1940s, the Laundry Workers Union and the Native Clothing Workers 
Union became the centers of two separate confederations of black labor.20 A 
series of mixed unions 2! subsequently emerged. In this period, the black work-
force increased substantially. In 1934, for example, the manufacturing work-
force was evenly divided between whites and blacks; by the end of World War 
II, two-thirds of the labor force was black. 22 Whites and blacks, however, were 
not integrated; the Factory Act23 effectively divided the workplace. 24 
Despite this division, black labor did make some advances during the 1940s. 
The African Mineworkers Union was formed in 1941 by the Transvaal Branch 
of the African National Congress (ANC).25 The union grew rapidly and staged 
walkouts and strikes throughout the decade. 26 These culminated in 1946 when 
100,000 black miners went on strike over wage demands.27 Along with the 
growth of union activities in mines, industrial unions in certain areas of the 
country occasionally accepted black members,28 and parallel unions were created 
15Id. The "Rand," short for Witwatersrand, is the name given to the gold-rich high ridges of the 
Transvaal province. J. HOAGLAND, SOUTH AFRICA: CIVILIZATIONS IN CONFLICT 26 (1972). 
16 Bonacich, supra note 14, at 254. 
17Id. 
18 Gould, supra note 8, at 101. 
IY Bonacich, supra note 14, at 254. 
20 Gould, supra note 8, at 103. 
21Id. Mixed unions are here defined as those having both black and white members. Two primary 
examples of such mixed unions include the Garment Workers Union and the Food Canning Workers 
Union.Id. 
22 Marsh, Labor Reform and Security Repression in South Africa, 12 ISSUE: JOURNAL OF AFRICANIST 
OPINION 46, 49 (1982). 
23 Factories, Machinery and Building Work Act, 1941 STAT. S. AFR. No. 22. 
24 Gould, supra note 8, at 110. 
25 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 50. The ANC is the most powerful of the underground political 
movements in South Africa, and has been banned since 1960. Founded in 1925 and supported 
primarily by communist sources, the ANC has initiated a campaign of sabotage and guerilla attacks 
which have recently increased in sophistication and frequency. ANC support has been strong in those 
areas where legitimate black unions appear ineffective. See generally Davis, Cason & Hovey, Economic 
Disengagement and South Africa, 15 L. & POL'y IN INT'L Bus. 529, 541 (1983); Karis, A Revolution in the 
Making: Black Politirs in South Africa, 62 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 375 (1984); O'Meara, South Africa: No New 
Political Dispensation, CURRENT HIST., March, 1984, at 105, 107. 
26 Gould, supra note 8, at 103. An African Mineworkers Union strike in 1943 involved 73,557 
workers, nine of whom were killed in clashes with police. SOUTH AFRICAN WORKING PARTY OF THE 
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, SOUTH AFRICA: CHALLENGE AND HOPE 135 (1982). 
27 South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, AFRICAN CONFIDENTIAL, July 4, 1984, at I. The strike turned 
violent, ending when police drove miners back to work with bayonets. /d. 
28 Gould, supra note 8, at 103. 
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for blacks. 29 Notwithstanding these changes, there were signs that conditions in 
industry would not improve rapidly. 
In 1948, the Nationalist Party gained control of the government, partly 
through the backing of a right wing labor movement hostile to black workers.30 
This Party initiated the rapid development of the apartheid policies of South 
Africa. 3 ! In the labor context, the role of apartheid was to exclude blacks from 
the white labor market, or, failing that, to use the blacks as a source of cheap 
migratory labor.32 In order to accomplish this social segregation, the government 
passed the Population Registration Act of 1950,3:1 which sorted the population 
into various racial groups.34 The Group Areas Acts of 196635 divided the country 
into areas of occupation solely on the basis of race. 36 Within the labor context 
specifically, the 1953 Black Labour Relations Regulation Act37 retained the 
wartime ban on strikes by blacks, and established a separate system for the 
negotiation of wages and labor conditions for blacks.38 
None of the foregoing legislative provisions affected the entire labor situation 
as sweepingly as did the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act. 39 Not only did this 
Act exclude blacks from the legal definition of employee,4° but it also forestalled 
the registration of mixed unions.4 ! Blacks were thus formally removed from 
29 Gould, supra note 8, at 121. A parallel union is one designed to shadow a pre-existing white union. 
These unions can negotiate collective bargaining agreements, but often their leverage is weak. [d. at 
121-22. Parallel unions share the same facilities with the parent white union, and are run by the same 
general secretary. !d. at 121. The parent union collects dues and recruits members for the parallel 
union. [d. In the past, the parallel unions have clearly been in a subordinate position. See id. at 122. 
30 Gould, supra note 8, at 103. See also Lansing, supra note 7, at 305. 
31 Lansing, supra note 7, at 305. Apartheid is defined as the exclusion and separation of non-whites 
from institutional bases of power. See L.J. BOULI.E, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND APARTHEID 82 (1984). 
32 Bonacich, supra note 14, at 259. The system of migrant labor and its relationship with the 
Bantustan policy will be examined infra notes 77-93 and accompanying text. 
" Population Registration Act, 1950 STAT. S. AFR. No. 30. 
34 See Lansing, supra note 7, at 306 n.14. The Act provides for the Secretary of the Interior to 
register the entire South African population according to race. [d. 
"Group Areas Act, 1966 STAT. S. AFR. No. 36. 
36 See, e.g., KAHN & RUDOLPH, CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD: SOUTH AFRICA, 6 
(1984). The city centers are exclusively set aside for whites, and black trade unions are not permitted 
to have offices in these areas. White landowners have been threatened for allowing black trade unions 
to use their buildings. See Gould, supra note 8, at 109. 
37 Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, 1953 STAT. S. AFR. No. 48. 
38 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 24. For a discussion of this Act, see infra text accompanying notes 
149-54. 
39 Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28. 
40 Marsh, supra note 22, at 50. 
4l Gould, supra note 8, at 125. The Act permitted mixed unions which had previously registered to 
maintain their status. [d. These unions, however, were required to hold segregated meetings, and the 
leadership had to be white. [d. Section 66 of the Act did extend protection to white workers desiring 
unionization. [d. A worker could not be fired for belonging to a union or engaging in union activity 
outside working hours. This provision is important for blacks because its protection was automatically 
extended through recent legislative reforms. See infra text accompanying notes 165-69. 
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the collective bargaining process.42 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, other 
legislation was passed further restraining black labor.4~ 
The measures promulgated by the government in this period increasingly 
frustrated the black population. On March 21, 1960, a crowd of 200,000 blacks 
gathered to protest at the police station in Sharpesville.14 Violence left sixty-
seven blacks dead.4s Subsequently, the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
(SACTU) gained strength.46 SACTU, initially composed of eight unregistered 
black unions and four mixed unions, became politically involved in resisting 
apartheid. 47 The government tolerated this activism for a short period, before 
responding with restrictions and bans upon SACTU leaders.4s It was also during 
this period that the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) first ad-
mitted black members, but subsequent reversals on this policy led to distrust 
within the black labor community.4" This labor activism seemed to subside until 
the early 1970s.5" In 1973, spontaneous strikes broke out in Durban, the third 
largest city in South Africa. 51 The blacks demanded higher wages, and they 
elected ad hoc committees to represent them in discussions with management. 
Although the strikes were illegal and accordingly met with police response, 
many businessmen realized that negotiation with authorized representatives 
would stabilize the situation. 52 Thus, negotiations were held, and, to the surprise 
of many, certain black demands were granted, particularly in the area of wages. 53 
42 Id. at 102. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 196-208. 
43 The Wages Act, 1957 STAT. S. AFR. No.5, for example, provides that the government establish 
wage guidelines in those industries where industrial councils are ineffective. Since the Act applies to 
all races, it was considered the major statutory protection for black workers. Decisions, however, would 
be exclusively under government control. See Gould, supra note 8, at 142. 
44 F. PARKER, SOUTH AFRICA: LOST OPPORTUNITIES 61 (1983). 
4.' Id. 
46 Gould, supra note 8, at 104. 
47 Id. SACTU was aligned with the banned South African Communist Party. See Barrell, Black Unions 
Feel the Squeeze, NEW STATESMAN, June 27, 1980, at 953. 
4R Gould, supra note 8, at 104. A banned person is not permitted to discuss politics or policy with 
others, cannot be quoted in the press, and is often forced to live in virtual internal exile. DAVIS, CASON, 
& HOVEY, supra note 25, at 543 nAI. See aLw Black Unions Start Winning, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 
1982, at 10. 
4" Gould, supra note 8, at 104. TCSCA is one of South Africa's largest trade union federations, and 
was formed in 1954. See DEPT. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INFORMATION, SOUTH AFRICA 1984: OFFICIAL 
YEARBOOK OF THE REPVBLlC OF SOVTH AFRICA 471 (1984) [hereinafter cited as SOUTH AFRICA 1984]. 
TUSCA originally barred black unions from affiliation, but allowed them to enter in 1962. Id. In 1969, 
they reversed their policy, but in 1974, TliSCA again allowed black unions to be members. Id. 
50 Gould, supra note 8, at III. 
5l Id. 
52 NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. I, 1983, at II, 12. 
53Id. The Trade Union Advisory Committee, for example, negotiated a collective bargaining agree-
ment in 1974 between the National Union of Textiles and the British corporation Smith and Nephew. 
See Gould, supra note 8, at 119. 
168 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. IX, No.1 
After this moderate success, new black unions quickly formed in Durban and 
Johannesburg.54 The government response was to amend the Black Labour 
Relations Regulation Act55 to revitalize the system of black representation 
through the introduction of liaison committees.56 It was clearly the government's 
policy to encourage this controlled black participation in lieu of unions. Prime 
Minister Volster also engineered legislation allowing black workers a limited 
participation in Wage Board proceedings, if the issues discussed were deemed 
by the Labour Department to affect black workers,s? 
While this legislation seemed to give black unions a degree of leverage, the 
government attempted to confine the union movement to the strict contours of 
legally permissible activity. Detentions and bannings of labor leaders continued 
and had a chilling effect on the black union movement in the mid-1970s. 58 
Volster's government also created the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) to spy 
upon and to intimidate labor activists and student labor organizers.59 Despite 
these efforts, unions were formed in the 1970s in a variety of industries.60 
The reformist thrust emerging in 1973 also became evident in the wake of 
the Soweto Riots in 1976.61 The police were again called to stop the violence, 
which soon spread to other urban areas.62 Soon thereafter, the government 
appointed the Wiehahn Commission63 to investigate South Africa's labor legis-
lation, and the Riekert Commission to explore manpower utilization and influx 
control measures. 54 The recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission, which 
came out in six parts ending in September 1981,65 proved to be immediately 
relevant to black unions. The legislation enacted according to the recommen-
dations of the Wiehahn Commission constitutes the primary focus of this article, 
54 See Gould, supra note 8, at III. 
55 Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act, 1973 STAT. S. AFR. No. 70. 
56 Gould, supra note 7, at III. See note 152 and accompanying text. 
57 Marsh, supra note 22, at 51. 
58 Gould, Unions, supra note II, at 719. 
5" Marsh, supra note 22, at 51. In the early 1970's, university students often helped advise and train 
workers regarding union activities. BOSS, seeing this as a revolutionary communist conspiracy, banned 
student labor organizers and destroyed offices and records. /d. 
60 Marsh, supra note 22, at 50. For example, unions were formed by auto workers, textile workers, 
caterers, metal workers, transport workers, food and canning workers, stevedores, and clothing work-
ers. Id. 
6] Spence, Reform in South Africa-A Tangled Web, CONTEMP. REV., Jan. 1984, at 6. 
62 Hanf, Lessons Which are Never Learnt: Minority Rule in Comparative Perspective, IS J. ASIAN & AFRICAN 
STUD., Jan. 19S3, at 22,24. On June 16, 1976, a thirteen year old boy protesting in front of a high 
school in Soweto was shot by the police. F. PARKER, supra note 44, at 61. The ensuing violence left 575 
dead.Id. 
63 The Wiehahn Commission was composed of fourteen representatives of management and labor, 
and was headed by industrial relations professor Nicholas Wiehahn. F. PARKER, supra note 44, at 41. 
64 DAVIS, CASON & HOVEY, supra note 25, at 544 n.43. For a discussion of the system of influx 
control, see infra text accompanying notes 77-91. 
65 A Fast Rise for South Africa'S Black Unions, Bus. WK., Oct. 19, 19SI, at 113. 
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and will be examined after a discussion of the general labor conditions in South 
Africa. 
III. BLACK LABOR CONDITIONS 
In a nation ruled by whites,66 black workers constitute seventy-two percent of 
the workforce.67 Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming number of blacks, it 
has been the longstanding desire of the white government to confine the blacks 
by creating separate nations within South Africa. These homelands, or bantus-
tans, are traditionally rural black areas constituting thirteen percent of the land 
area of South Africa. 68 The goal of the apartheid policy has been to force these 
areas to become independent black states, thus permanently denying blacks 
citizenship rights in South Africa.69 This policy was given force by the passage 
of the Black Authorities Act of 1951,70 which helped to advance the self-
governing powers of these areas,71 and by the National States Constitution Act 
of 1971. 72 The ultimate plan of the white regime is to create a confederation 
of independent states. 73 
The bantustan policy has two functions. First, the government hopes to 
remove physically blacks from the white areas so that whites can maintain their 
political power. 74 Secondly, the creation of homelands serves to control a black 
66 South Africa recently enacted a new Constitution creating a tricameral parliament, with houses 
for whites, Asians, and mixed races. See generally LJ. BOULLE, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND APARTHEID 
(1984). The white chamber, however, has the largest number of members, dominates the election of 
the president, and effectively controls all real power. !d. at 217. The blacks remain totally excluded. 
[d. 
67 See J. NATTRASS, THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 35 (1981); DAVIS, CASON & HOVEY, supra note 
25, at 536 n.17. According to the 1980 census, South Africa was composed of 4.5 million whites, 2.6 
million mixed-race, 0.8 million Asians, and 17 million blacks. See KAHN & RUDOLPH, supra note 36, at 
17. 
68 Lansing, supra note 7, at 306. 
69 See id. Most blacks, however, would continue to live and work within South Africa. [d. According 
to the 1980 census, of the 17 million blacks, only 6.5 million live within the homeland areas. KAHN & 
RUDOLPH, supra note 36, at 18. 
70 Black Authorities Act, 1951 STAT. S. AFR. No. 68. 
71 See, e.g., KAHN & RUDOLPH, supra note 36, at 18. 
72 National States Constitution Act, 1971 STAT. S. AFR. No. 21. By 1972, legislative bodies had been 
established in seven of the homelands. See KAHN & RUDOLPH, supra note 36, at 21. To date, four black 
homelands have been granted independence: Transkie (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979), 
and Ciskei (1981). [d. at 12. Kwandebele is the next homeland scheduled for independence. See 
Wrestling the Tiger, TIME, Dec. 24, 1984, at 34, 36. 
73 Slabbert, Sham Reform and Conflict Regulation in a Divided Society, 18 J. ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD., 34, 
40 (1983). Kwandebele stands as a typical example of the viability of the homelands. Located in an 
impoverished farming district north of Pretoria, Kwandebele has one paved road, no resident doctors, 
a water shortage, and can employ only two percent of its people. See Wrestling the Tiger, TIME, supra 
note 72, at 34, 36. 
74 See, e.g., Slabbert, supra note 73, at 34, 40. This first goal is proving not to be feasible, as rapid 
industrialization has caused a migration of blacks toward urban areas. See id. at 36. The policy has 
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labor force which is the economic foundation of South Africa.7s Because of the 
poverty of the bantustans, blacks must seek work in the white areas, but their 
presence is a revocable privilege granted and regulated by the white govern-
ment. 76 
In order to accomplish the second function, controlling the black labor force, 
South Africa has instituted numerous laws designed to regulate migrant work-
ers. The foremost of these influx control measures is the Black [Urban Areas] 
Consolidation Act.77 Section 10 of this statute mandates that a black may remain 
in an urban area for more than seventy-two consecutive hours only if that 
individual: 1) has resided in the area continuously since birth; 2) has worked 
for the same employer continuously for ten years; 3) has lawfully resided in the 
area for at least fifteen years; 4) is a dependent of someone who falls under 1, 
2, or 3 above; or 5) receives a special work permit.78 Typically, the workers 
falling under exception five have been registered for only an eleven month 
contract period,79 and have had to return for one month each year to the 
homelands. Before 1983, this meant that the blacks could not establish per-
manent residence under exception two above. In May 1983, however, the South 
African Appeals Court ruled in Rikhoto v. East Rand Administration Board80 that 
authorities can no longer deny permanent residency to migrant workers merely 
because they are required to renew their job contracts annually.81 The result of 
this decision is that those blacks who have worked for one employer for ten 
years or various employers for fifteen years are not subject to deportation if 
they lose their jobs.82 Thus, the Rikhoto decision affects the rights of 1.2 million 
blacks. 
Initially, the South African government attempted to pass legislation coun-
teracting the Rikhoto ruling, but under international pressure, the Minister for 
Cooperation and Development, Pieter C. Koornhof, agreed that the govern-
ment would accept the court's decision.83 The government, however, did enact 
a law stating that anyone obtaining urban rights must demonstrate that he has 
legal housing in the black township. Since there is a housing shortage, the 
legislation undercuts the Rikhoto ruling.84 
also been expensive: in 1983 the bantustan programs cost South Africa $1.5 billion, or nine percent 
of the national budget. See Wrestling the Tiger, sufrra note 72, at 34, 36. 
75 Davis, Cason & Hovey, sufrra note 25, at 536. 
76 [d. at 536-37. 
77 Black [Urban Areas] Consolidation Act, 1945 STAT. S. AFR. No. 25. 
78 [d. § 10(1). 
79 Gould, supra note 8, at 105 n.2B. 
80 Rikhoto v. East Rand Administration Board, (4)278(W) (1983). 
81 !d. at 285. 
82 N.Y. Times, June I, 1983, at 9, col. 1. 
83 O'Meara, supra note 25, at 107-08. 
84 Lewis, ApartheidJustice, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 20, 1984, at 11. 
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The Riekert Commission85 had earlier refused to consider the abolition of 
Section 10 restrictions86 on black workers.87 Thus, despite the court ruling, 
every black is still required to carry a pass indicating his status. A significant 
number of blacks are, however, illegally present in urban areas.88 
In September, 1984, the courts administered by the Department of Justice 
assumed jurisdiction over pass law violations.89 Courts administered by the 
Department of Coordination and Development had previously held jurisdiction 
over this area. 90 This action reversed the policy of a separate court system for 
blacks, and hearings have consequently been more juSt.91 
Influx control measures are only the most obvious of the regulations affecting 
the free mobility of blacks. Other legislation equally dictates and monitors black 
movement. The Black Administration Act 38 of 192792 is one of the more 
sweeping of such laws. It authorizes the state president to order a group or an 
individual to move from one place to another in what he sees as the general 
public interest.93 The potential of this legislation to chill any labor activism is 
apparent. 
Apart from the specific restraints of the bantustan policy and the migratory 
labor system, there are numerous other obstacles, both statutory and customary, 
that stand in the way of black labor advancement. One of the most deeply 
ingrained of these restrictions is the practice that no white employee may be 
subordinate to a black.94 Although this code has been broken in a few isolated 
instances,95 the general prohibition remains intact.96 
85 See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
86 See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
87 Gould, supra note 8. at 106. The Commission characterized the issue as political, and thus outside 
its purview. Id. On September 12, 1985, however, a government-sponsored President's Council rec-
ommended the abolition of all influx control measures. N.Y. Times, September 13, 1985, at I, col. 5. 
88 Gould, supra note 8, at 106. In 1983,260,000 blacks were arrested for pass law violations. Christian 
Science Monitor, Nov. 15, 1984, at 21, col. l. Two common offenses are I) remaining in an urban 
area without exemption for more than 72 hours, and 2) failure to produce an identifying document 
on demand. Id. 
89 Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 15, 1984, at 21, col. l. 
90ld. 
91Id. 
92 Black Administration Act, 1927 STAT. S. AFR. No. 38. 
93 !d. § 5. The president need not provide advance notice before making such an order, nor must 
he give any reasons to support his belief that the removal is in the public interest. Id. 
94 Note, U.D. Labor Practices in South Africa, 7 FORDHAM L. REV. 358, 375 (1984). 
95 In 1983, there were 500 white employees who took orders from blacks and non-whites in U.S. 
firms in South Africa. Sullivan, Agents for Change, 15 L. & POL'y IN INT'L Bus. 433 (1983). See also infra 
text accompanying notes 122-32. 
96 The Minister of Labor at one time was empowered to bar anyone from a job in order to avoid 
interracial competition. Industrial Conciliation Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28 § 77. Thus, although 
the prohibition against black supervision is not directly mandated, it has had the obvious support of 
the government in the past. 
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Another problem faced by black workers is the wage gap. Although the 
average monthly wage for blacks has increased at a higher percentage than the 
wage of the average white worker, in absolute cash terms the gap in wages has 
continued to increase.97 Many United States firms in South Africa now offer 
equal pay for equal work,98 but this has not had a profound impact because 
most blacks do not share equal work with whites. Until very recently, blacks 
were virtually excluded from skilled labor and managerial positions.99 Further-
more, any increase in black wages has been minimized by the inflation rate in 
South Africa, where prices have increased 400% since the late 1970's.100 
Certain factors indicate, though, that the plight of the black in South Africa 
may be becoming gradually ameliorated. The bantustan policy, for example, is 
proving to be unrealistic. 101 The policy of development of separate black nations 
did not correctly predict the extent of urbanization and industrialization in 
South Africa, and the resulting urban migration by blacks. 102 In 1968, the 
government attempted to reverse this trend through industrial decentralization 
policies, but the measures proved futile.103 Subsequently, the government has 
given to black suburbs of South African cities a certain degree of autonomy, 
including, in certain cases, the authority to collect taxes.!04 The permanency of 
the black presence in white areas of South Africa has also been acknowledged 
through the granting of ninety-nine year leaseholds in homes and business 
97 Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25, at 538 n.23. From 1970 to 1980, black wages grew 400%; 
from 1979 to 1982, the wage increase was 214%. In contrast, the wages for whites increased 250% 
from 1970 to 1980, and 175% between 1979 and 1982. However, the difference in actual wages 
between the average white and average black worker grew from $321 in 1970 to $698 in 1980, and 
was $773 in 1982. [d. 
98 Wrestling the Tiger, supra note 72, at 34, 36. This is one of the legacies of the Sullivan Principles. 
See infra text accompanying notes 122-32. 
99 Gould, supra note 8, at 125. One reason for this problem is the lack of educational opportunities 
that has plagued blacks in South Africa. The nation spends 90% less on the education of a black child 
than it does on that of a white child. South Africa'S Need for More Black Managers, Bus. WK., June 8, 
1981, at 78. Only 0.3% of black urban workers have a college education and 40% have no education 
at all. [d. Certain corporations have offered remedial English and math courses on company time, but 
the overall effect on the literacy rate has been minimal. [d. 
100 Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25, at 539 n.23. 
101 The government has promised a complete reevaluation and reconsideration of its policy of 
resettling blacks. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 4, 1985, at 13, col. 3. Prime Minister Botha announced 
in a recent speech that blacks were invited to take part in informal talks aimed at developing mutually 
acceptable political institutions for blacks not living in the homelands. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 
28, 1985, at 9, col. I. In addition, a pamphlet distributed by the National Party rejected a central tenet 
of apartheid, that blacks and whites should live in separate, adjoining states. An Afrikaner Turnabout?, 
NEWSWEEK, May 20, 1985, at 41. 
102 Siabbert, supra note 73, at 40. Urban areas now contain 48% of South Africa's residents, but this 
will rise to 80% in the year 2000. F. PARKER, supra note 44, at 40. Of the projected 22 million living 
in cities in 2000, 15 million will be black. !d. 
103 Marsh, supra note 22, at 50. In addition, the government has recently indicated that blacks may 
soon be permitted to own land outright. Boston Globe, December 5, 1985, at 23, col. 3. 
104 Dedial, Contours of a New Order in South Africa, 34 SWISS REV. OF WORLD AFF. 8, 10 (July 1984). 
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premises. lOS Finally, the government has recently announced that it will suspend 
forced resettlement into the bantustans, or black homeiands. 106 
IV. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES 
The internal labor conditions have prompted black protest, which has led to 
the legislation which will be discussed in Section V. Certain international pres-
sures, as well, have influenced the development of the recent legislation. An 
overview of these pressures is necessary to a full understanding of the legal 
changes. 
A. U.S. Policies 
The United States has the potential to exert substantial influence upon black 
labor in South Africa. In 1983, U.S. investments in South Africa totalled $13.3 
billion.lo7 This includes $2.3 billion in direct investment, $4.6 billion in bank 
loans, and $6.4 billion in shareholdings. 108 U.S. companies control 70 percent 
of South Africa's computer industry, 50 percent of its oil industry and 30 percent 
of its automobile industry. 109 Thus, U.S. influence could be exercised on South 
African labor indirectly through divestment of these holdings, or directly 
through the labor policies employed by U.S. firms doing business in South 
Africa. 
The divestment question is beyond the scope of this article, but a brief 
overview will serve to highlight the complexity of the problem. In basic terms, 
state and federal legislatures must balance any desire for change in the South 
African laws with the need to protect what are considered vital national inter-
ests. IIO The official stance of the U.S. government at this time balances these 
competing interests in a policy of constructive engagemenLIII This policy favors 
105 Chettle, The Law and Policy oj Divestment oj South African Stock, 15 L. & POL'y IN INT'L Bus. 445, 
451 (1983). Banks will now issue loans to blacks since they can put up their leaseholds as security. See 
Wall Street Journal, June 19, 1984, at I, col. I. 
106 North, Divestment Imperative, Tm: NEW REPUBLIC, March 25, 1985, at 10. 
107 Strategic Sales to South AJrica Reach New High, AFRICA NEWS, Oct. 22, 1984, at 2. 
108 !d. In 1984, the amount of direct investment dropped to $1.8 billion, and bank loans went to 
$3.9 billion. U.S. Measures Gainl, Losses in South AJrica, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, August 12, 1985, 
at 22. 
109 Now It's Congress V.I. South AJrica, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, June 17, 1985, at 10. 
110 In terms of national interest, South Africa controls the shipping routes around the Cape of Good 
Hope that are used to transport oil from the Persian Gulf. Moreover, South Africa supplies 50 percent 
of the platinum used by the Cnited States, 44 percent of the vanadium, 31 percent of the manganese, 
and 55 percent of the chromium. U.S. Measures Gaim, Losses in South AJrica, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, August 12, 1985, at 22. See also Lansing, supra note 7, at 309-10; Fatton, The Reagan Foreign 
Policy Toward South Africa: The Ideology oj the New Cold War, 27 AFRICAN STUD. REV. 57, 65 (March 
1984). 
III See Fatton, supra note 110, at 57. 
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continued support for the South African government tempered with private 
encouragement toward liberalization of the racial laws of the nation.ll2 After a 
meeting in December, 1984, with the winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Bishop 
Desmund M. Tutu, President Reagan seemingly abandoned his policy of quiet 
diplomacy to call upon South Africa to initiate a dialogue with the black major-
ity.ll3 In September, 1985, President Reagan reversed his prior opposition to 
economic sanctions against South Africa. ll4 Through an executive order, the 
President adopted many of the anti-apartheid measures that had previously 
been sought by Congress. 115 The President insisted, however, that he still fa-
vored a policy of active constructive engagement. 116 
Despite the stance of the federal government, many states and municipalities 
have passed divestment legislation on their own. ll7 Support for divestment has 
come in large part from universities, church groups, and labor unions. lls Aside 
from domestic considerations,ll9 there is debate regarding the desirability of 
divestment in terms of the black worker in South Africa. Some commentators 
have speculated that divestment would result in black unemployment, but that 
whites would be unaffected because of the shortage of skilled workers in the 
Republic. 120 Other commentators envision unemployment as a possible result, 
but feel that it is a fair price to pay for real political change in South Africa. 121 
112Id. 
II' Boston Globe, Dec. 11, 1984, at I, col. 4. 
114 N.Y. Times, September 10, 1985, at I, col. 5. 
115Id. The executive order included: 1) a ban on loans to South Africa, except those loans designed 
to improve economic opportunities, or educational, housing and health facilities that are open to all 
races, 2) a proposal to ban the importation of the krugerrand to the United States, 3) a ban on all 
computer exports to military, police and security forces and agencies involved in the enforcement of 
apartheid, 4) a prohibition of all exports of nuclear technology. except those required to carry out 
international agreements on the spread of nuclear arms, or those deemed necessary to protect public 
health and safety, and 5) the importation of any arms or military vehicles produced in South Africa. 
/d. 
116 N.Y. Times, September 10, 1985, at I, col. 5. 
117 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 32, § 23(1)(d)(ii) (West Supp. 1983): 
After January first, nineteen hundred and eighty-three, no public pension funds under this 
subsection shall remain invested in any bank or financial institution which directly or through 
its subsidiaries has outstanding loans to the Republic of South Africa or its instrumentalities, 
and no assets shall remain invested in the stocks, securities or other obligations of any company 
doing business in or with the Republic of South Africa. 
118 Lansing, supra note 7, at 312. The AFL-CIO has called for complete divestment./d. In addition, 
the United Auto Workers has announced that it would withdraw funds from institutions making loans 
to South Africa. Id. 
119 Divestment raises the question of the fiduciary duties of investors, as well as constitutional 
questions regarding the commerce clause and the supremacy clause. For a good cross-section of opinion 
on the divestment question, see generally Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25; Chettle, supra note 
105; Lansing, supra note 7; Note, University Investments with a South African Connection: Is Prudent" 
Divestiture Possible?, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 543 (1979). 
120 Chettle, supra note 105, at 485. 
J2J South Africa: Black Union Power, NATION, Jan. 31, 1981, at 103. The newly-formed Congress of 
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Statutory change in South Africa may also be prompted by U.S. corporations 
directly influencing the working conditions of the blacks. Improved labor con-
ditions in one sector of the economy might well prompt blacks in other sectors 
to seek the same benefits through labor legislation. Certain U.S. corporations 
are currently attempting to accomplish this goal through the Sullivan Principles. 
The Principles, devised by the Reverend Leon Sullivan, a member of the board 
of directors of Ford Motor Company, consist of a six point code of conduct for 
U.S. corporations employing blacks in South Africa. 122 Participation in the pro-
gram is voluntary, and there are currently 128 signatories. 123 Recently, a group 
of executives representing the signatory corporations unanimously endorsed 
additions to the code. 124 The additions commit the companies to support free-
dom of mobility for black workers, the unrestricted right of black businesses to 
locate in South African urban areas, and the eventual end of all apartheid 
laws. 125 
Despite these resolutions, the results of the Sullivan Principles are unclear. 
Signatory companies have to some degree improved the conditions of employ-
ment within their organizations. Most signatories report that they have complied 
with the first three of the six principles: non-segregation of the workplace, equal 
and fair employment practices, and equal pay for equal work. 126 There have 
also been improvements under the other principles. In 1983, signatories spent 
$6 million on training programs for 27,277 nonwhite employees. 127 In addition, 
$7 million was contributed toward the education of non-employees. 128 Certain 
signatories have been among the leaders in South Africa in recognizing and 
promoting the black labor movement. 129 
South African Trade Unions has stated that it supports divestment by American and British companies 
of their South African holdings. N.V. Times. December 2.1985. at I. col. 3. See infra note 322. 
122 The Sullivan Principles call for: I) non-segregation of the races in all eating. comfort. and work 
facilities; 2) equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3) equal pay for all employees 
doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time; 4) initiation of and development of 
training programs that will prepare. in substantial numbers. blacks and other non-whites for super-
visory. administrative. clerical. and technical jobs; 5) increasing the number of blacks and other non-
whites in management and supervisory positions; and 6) improving the quality of employees' lives 
outside the work environment in such areas as housing. transportation. schooling. recreation. and 
health facilities. Supplementing these measures are guidelines calling for recognition of black unions. 
See generally. Sullivan. supra note 95. at 427. In December. 1984. four new principles were adopted. 
asking American firms to: 1) give black businesses freedom to locate in urban areas of their choice; 
2) encourage South African firms to adhere to the Sullivan Principles; 3) give blacks freedom to move 
to areas where jobs are available; and 4) seek the end of legal apartheid. Christian Science Monitor. 
October 2. 1985. at 3. 
123 Christian Science Monitor. October 2. 1985. at 7. col. 3. 
124 Russell. supra note 1. at 23. 
125 [d. 
126 See Note. supra note 96. at 363. 
127 /d. at 364. 
128 [d. 
129 The Ford Motor Company. for example. was the first corporation in South Africa to permit full-
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Nevertheless, cntlcs of the Sullivan Principles assert that the guidelines do 
not extend far enough. They claim that the Principles fail by attacking effects, 
such as working conditions, rather than the causes of the conditions, the apart-
heid policies themselves. '3o Critics emphasize that most U.S. corporations in 
South Africa are not signatories, and that, in fact, the number is declining. l3l 
Other criticism points to the fact that a very small percentage of the workforce 
in South Africa is affected by the Principles. '32 
B. Other Foreign Actions 
Other nations and international organizations have brought pressure on 
South African labor policies. For example, the Organization of African Unity, 
formed in 1963,133 has imposed a total economic boycott against South Africa. 
These sanctions have proven ineffective, however, as many of the member 
nations are dependent upon South African trade. 134 The United Nations has 
also passed numerous resolutions condemning South African policies, but most 
economic sanctions have been vetoed in the Security Council. I35 The United 
Nations, however, has passed arms embargoes, most recently through Resolu-
tion 418 in 1977.136 Finally, various bodies have instituted codes of conduct 
similar to the Sullivan Principles, such as the European Code, the Canadian 
Code, the Urban Foundation Code, the Cape Code, and the Barlow Rand 
time black shop stewards in its factories; Kellogg Company was the second to sign an agreement 
recognizing a black trade union; Borg-Warner Corporation was among the first to directly negotiate 
wages with black workers. Note, supra note 96, at 364-65; see G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 92. Ford 
and General Motors both started training programs for black artisans and apprentices in the late 
1970's. [d. Gillette's South African subsidiary has recently opened a legal-aid clinic to serve blacks. 
Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 13, 1985, at I, col. l. The clinic, the first of its kind in South Africa, 
is designed to assist blacks in understanding their rights within the influx control system. !d. In addition, 
a number of companies have adopted the policy of recognizing unregistered black unions, if such 
unions represent the wishes of the workers. Chettle, supra note 105, at 465. 
130 Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 13, 1984, at 28, col. l. ' 
13I For criticism of the Sullivan Principles, see, for example, Davis, Cason, and Hovey, supra note 
25, at 550; Lansing, supra note 7, at 307; Note, supra note 96, at 366. Only two of the seven U.S. 
companies employing over 5000 workers in South Africa have signed the Principles. Note, supra note 
122, at 366. 
m See Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25, at 551 n.77. The U.S. firms adhering to the Sullivan 
Principles employ 66,000 workers. This number represents only l. I percent of South Africa's total 
labor force. Christian Science Monitor, October 2,1985, at 7, col. 3. 
133 R. LEONARD, SOUTH AFRICA AT WAR 46 (1983). 
13. Maddrey, Economic Sanctions and Human Rights, 22 VA. J. OF INT'L L. 345, 376 (1981). 
135 For discussions regarding the United Nations in this context, see Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra 
note 25, at 530 n.5; Maddrey, supra note 134, at 372; Chettle, supra note 105, at 495 n.234; Johnson, 
Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 887, 904 (1978). 
136 S.C. Res. 418, 32 U.N. SCOR (2046th mtg.) 5, U.N. Doc. S/INF/32 (1977). 
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Code. 137 Although certain of these codes are more restrictive than the Sullivan 
Code,138 they have met with many of the same difficulties. 139 
V. RECENT LEGISLATION 
A. Background 
The history of the labor movement, current labor conditions, and interna-
tional pressures are all factors that presage the recent labor legislation. Essential 
to an analysis of this legislation is an examination of the original Industrial 
Conciliation Act of 1956,140 which, in amended form, is still the law. The Act 
was passed after a rapid expansion of industry following World War II,l41 and 
governed dispute resolution between employers and employees by creating 
machinery for collective bargaining. 142 To this end, the Act provided for the 
registration of trade unions and employers' associations, and for the creation 
of industrial councils. Through these councils, disputes were to be resolved by 
negotiations toward industrial agreements. 143 
The Act, however, excluded blacks from the legal definition of employee,144 
thus formally removing them from the officially sanctioned collective bargaining 
process. 145 Registration is not a prerequisite for a union to function, to be 
recognized by an employer, or to conclude an agreement through collective 
bargaining. 146 Only agreements concluded through the machinery of the 1956 
Act, however, are protected by criminal sanctions. 147 Thus, while excluded black 
unions could negotiate, any resulting agreements could be enforced only 
through civil contract law. 148 
The government enacted the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act of 
1953149 and the Black Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1973150 to provide 
137 Sullivan. supra note 95, at 430. 
138 The code of the European Economic Community, for example, obliges management to provide 
union access to company property, to take steps toward engaging in collective bargaining, and to 
conclude such bargaining agreements. See Gould, supra note 8, at 156. 
1391d. at 153. 
"0 Industrial Conciliation Act. 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28. This legislation is also known as the 
Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28. 
1412 M. WILSON & L. THOMPSON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 36 (1971). 
142 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 449. 
143Id. The Act applied to all industrial trades and occupations, with the exception of agricultural 
workers, domestic servants, state employees, and charitable institutions. ld. 
"4 See note 40 and accompanying text. 
145 See infra text accompanying notes 196-208. 
146 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 450. 
1471d. 
148 Id. 
149 Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, 1953 STAT. S. AFR. No. 48. 
150 Black Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1973 STAT. S. AFR. No. 70. 
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blacks with parallellegislation. 151 These Acts provided for a degree of collective 
bargaining between blacks and their employers, through liaison and works 
committees.152 Since these bodies were relatively impotent,153 black grievances 
were generally unattended, and industry-wide decisions were made by the 
registered unions. ls4 
The provisions of the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act did not effec-
tively address the problems of industrial relations with blacks. This was evi-
denced by the limited use of the works and liaison committees, and by the 1976 
general strikes. In response to this problem, the government appointed the 
Wiehahn Commission in 1977 155 to investigate and make recommendations 
concerning South Africa's labor legislation. l56 Even prior to the recommenda-
tions of the Commission, the Associated Chambers of Commerce, representing 
businessmen throughout South Africa, had recommended that black unions be 
recognized and that job reservations - provisions for reserving certain em-
ployment positions for whites - be abolished. ls7 The final recommendations of 
the Commission led directly to the various amendments to the Industrial Con-
ciliation Act of 1956,ISR to be discussed shortly. 
B. Reasons for Change 
The government and business leaders sought registration of black trade 
unions for reasons having more to do with pragmatism than with humanitari-
151 H. RINGROSE, supra note 9, at R. 
I" The Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, 1953 STAT. S. AFR. No. 48, provided for works 
committees consisting of employees' representatives, to consult and negotiate with management re-
garding working conditions. The works committees could be formed if workers requested them in an 
industrial segment employing more than 20 workers, provided that the committee registered with the 
Department of Labour. See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 454. After the 1973 strikes, the Act 
was amended through the Black Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1973 STAT. S. AFR. No. 70, to 
provide for liaison committees in addition to works conlmittees. The liaison comnlittees were estab-
lished at the request of management, with the membership split equally between employers and 
employees. See SOl':TH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 454. They permitted blacks to discuss grievances 
on a plant-by-plant basis. fd. In 1977, the Black Labour Relations Act, 1977 STAT. S. AFR. No. 84, 
permitted works committees to negotiate enforceable collective bargaining agreements. 
153 In general, the committees were rejected because they were controlled by management and 
consulted only on relatively unimportant matters. See Gould, Are Black Unions the Key?, COMMONWEAL, 
Nov. 10, 1978, at 718; Black Unions Start Winning, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 1982, at 10; Note, supra 
note 96, at 375. 
154 See Gould, supra note 8, at 135. 
155 H. RINGROSE, supra note 9, at 10. 
156 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
157 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 90. This is one example of how business interests have been on the 
forefront of black labor development. fd. 
158 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28. 
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anism. 159 Even before the riots of the 1970s,16o the government had feared the 
revolutionary potential of the black workers.161 One effective way to minimize 
the possibility of revolution is to permit the existence of black unions, albeit 
under strictly guarded circumstances. Registered unions can provide a stable 
workplace and limit the exercise of violence. 162 
Part of the impetus for such changes came from the businessmen themselves, 
who saw that unions could create channels of communication that would help 
to alleviate conflict. Through the union system, a rational dialogue with a 
structured union would give black workers a stake in the existing South African 
system. 163 Although businessmen face the problem of resentment on the part 
of white workers,164 the need for change was strong enough to prompt legislative 
reform. 
C. Legislative Reforms 
The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Acts of 1979165 and 1980,166 and the 
Labour Relations Amendment Acts of 198 JI67 and 1982,168 did not change the 
essential character of the 1956 legislation. They merely extended the 1956 
legislation to blacks and thereby removed the necessity for a system of parallel 
legislation that existed via the 1953 and 1973 Black Labour Relations Regulation 
Act. 169 The more important specific changes and their results will now be 
discussed in turn. 
1. Freedom of Association and Registration 
The Wiehahn Commission recommended that trade unions be allowed free-
dom of association, regardless of an individual's race or status as a migrant 
commuter. 170 In 1979, the government responded by including blacks under 
159 See Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25, at 544. The South African government minister 
responsible for unions has stated that "we are registering black trade unions in order to control their 
activities." Id. International ostracism may also have played some role in the labor law reforms. Black 
trade unions have been receiving both moral and financial support from abroad. See Gould, Labour 
Pains, NATION, Feb. 23, 1980, at 196; Gould, supra note 8, at 129. 
160 See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text. 
161 St. Joire, South Africa: Is Change Coming?, 60 FOREIGN AFF. 106, 109 (1981). 
162 St. Joire, supra note 161, at 109. See also Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 20, 1984, at 13, col. I. 
163 NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1. 1983, at 12. 
164 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 92. 
165 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94. 
166 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1980 STAT. S. AFR. No. 95. 
167 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57. This Act changed the name of 
the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 to the Labour Relations Act of 1956. § 87. 
168 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1982 STAT. S. AFR. No.5!. 
169 See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 464. 
170 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 457. 
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the definition of employee.J7J The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1979, however, 
provided that only blacks with Section 10 rights l72 qualified as employees entitled 
to belong to registered unions, thus excluding migrant workers. Subsequently, 
black unions vowed a boycott on the registration process unless the government 
changed its policy. I73 On September 28, 1979, therefore, the Minister of Man-
power extended trade union rights to all citizens of South Africa, including 
migrant workers commuting from the independent bantustans. 174 The 1981 
amendment formalized this extension and redefined employees to include for-
eign workers from neighboring countries. 175 
Through these provisions, black unions were permitted to register for the 
first time and thus avail themselves of the collective bargaining permitted by 
the 1956 Labour Relations Act. 176 The legislation also permits black unions to 
use a check-off clause, whereby union dues are deducted directly from an 
employee's paycheck. 177 This registration, however, is not automatic, and sig-
nifies the required submission of a union to governmental controls. l7S A union 
seeking registration must demonstrate that its constitution is acceptable to the 
registrar,179 and that it has been viable for more than three months. 180 A reg-
istered union must also be apolitical. 181 
The 1979 Act, responding to the recommendations of the Wiehahn Com-
mission, set up a system of provisional registration for newly formed unions, 
which would exist until the unions demonstrated sufficient ability to entitle 
them to full registration. 182 Provisional registration, however, did not permit 
171 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 1(1). 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 77-88. The Black [Urban Areas] Consolidation Act, 1945 
STAT. S. AFR. No. 25, § III severely limits the circumstances in which blacks are allowed to reside in 
urban areas, 
m See Gould, supra note 8, at 131-32. 
174 SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, SURVEY OF RACE RELATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
1979285 (1980). This reversal was in the form of an administrative proclamation. Government Gazette 
No. 6679 of 28 Sept. (Notice R2167). 
m Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57, § I. 
176 See infra discussion accompanying notes 196-208. 
177 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 78(1B). A check-off clause provides a stable 
source of money for a union, eliminating typical collection problems. See Gould, supra note 8, at 137. 
The 1981 Act prohibits deduction of membership dues for an unregistered union, unless there is 
ministerial approval. Labour Relations Amendmeni Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57, § 78(lC). 
178 NEW REPUBLIC, August 1, 1983, at II, 12. There is a division among unions as to whether 
registration is desirable. See infra text accompanying notes 259-6\. 
179 The constitution of the union must specify qualifications relating to membership, property 
control, procedures for meetings, and methods for voting, among other things. Labour Relations Act, 
1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 8,9. Gould, supra note 8, at 137. 
180 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 4(1)(a). 
181 See infra text accompanying notes 253-56. 
182 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 4(A). See Gould, supra note 
8, at 138. 
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the union to be admitted into an industrial council. 183 Furthermore, under the 
Act the registrar was entitled to withdraw registration without explanation. 184 
The government cancelled the system of provisional registration through the 
Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1981, because these restrictions were 
fought so strongly by black unions. 185 
Section four of the Act denied registration to those unions composed of both 
black and white members,186 the so-called mixed unions. The Labour Relations 
Act of 1956 provided that no new mixed unions could be registered, and the 
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979 merely granted the Minister 
broader powers to grant exceptions to the general rule. 187 The 1981 Labour 
Relations Amendment Act, however, cancelled the requirement for ministerial 
approval of the registration of mixed unions. 188 One procedural effect of these 
measures is that certain white unions are more likely to recruit blacks for the 
first time, since black membership will not deny any benefits of registration. 
Another effect of the recent legislation is that contests for registration in a 
particular sector are often held between parallel unions l89 and independent 
black unions. 19o The union that is registered first can often deny representation 
to other unions. 191 Employers have on occasion encouraged the more moderate 
parallel unions by granting them special facilities not enjoyed by independent 
unions. 192 However, in January, 1980, the African Transport Workers' Union 
(ATWU) became the first independent black trade union to receive full regis-
tration. 193 
Initially, despite the legislation, most black unions met with difficulties in their 
attempts to negotiate recognition agreements with industries. 194 By June, 1984, 
however, there were 600 recognition agreements, far more than in 1980.195 
18' SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 459. See discussion regarding industrial councils infra notes 
199-204 and accompanying text. 
184 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 459. 
185 This was accomplished through the repeal of § 4(A). 
186 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 4. Registration was denied to unions containing 
members of more than one race. 
187 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 465. 
188Id. This was done through the deletion of §§ 4(3)(c) and 4(3)(d). If, however, one racial group is 
already adequately represented by another group, that racial group will be excluded from the regis-
tration extended to its union. Id. 
189 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
190 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 94. 
191 See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
192 G. CARTER, supra note 9, at 94. 
19, SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 460. 
194 Wall St. J., June 20, 1984, at 35, col. 2. 
195 [d. 
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2. Collective Bargaining 
The recent legislation is particularly important in that it abandons the liaison 
and works committee system set up by the 1953 Black Labour Relations Act 
and the 1973 Black Labour Relations Amendment Act,196 and opens up other 
avenues for collective bargaining for black unions. As noted, the works and 
liaison committees were not thought by blacks to wield any real power. 197 Es-
sentially, the 1979 Act permitted black unions to take advantage of the mech-
anism for dispute resolution created by the Labour Relations Act of 1956.198 
Specifically, collective bargaining is conducted through industrial councils. 199 
These councils are permanent bodies with jurisdiction over a particular industry 
or area, and are equally representative oflabor and management.200 The agree-
ments negotiated by these bodies are binding upon the parties, and the Minister 
is empowered to extend their provisions to certain non-parties. 201 
Where no industrial council was statutorily created, the Labour Relations Act 
of 1956 provided that registered unions or employers could apply for a concil-
iation board to settle a dispute. 202 Because the 1979 Act permitted the registra-
tion of black trade unions, this machinery became available to all races.203 In 
addition, the 1979 Act specifically repealed the prohibition against black rep-
resentatives.204 
In order to enable more workers to take part in the industrial conciliation 
process, the 1981 Act widened the definition of trade unions to cover virtually 
any organization involved in industrial relations.205 Admission to industrial 
councils, however, is not automatic. Under the 1979 Act, the members of an 
existing council are given the power to veto a new applicant on the grounds 
that the workers are already adequately represented on the council.206 Thus, 
even if a black union is registered, it may be shut out of the collective bargaining 
196 See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 463. Although the Black Labour Relations Regulation 
Act of 1953 was repealed, the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1980 provided for the 
formation of workers councils. §§ 34(A) and 34(B). Their role, however, remains virtually undefined. 
SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 463. 
197 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
198 See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 464. 
199 Gould, supra note 8, at 140. 
200 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, §§ 18-34. 
201 The agreements may be made binding upon employers and employees within the same industry, 
even if outside the specified area of the industrial council. Id. § 48(l)(c). 
202Id. §§ 35-42. 
203 See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 468. 
204Id. This was accomplished through the repeal of § 21(5). 
205 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57, § I. 
206 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 21(A). Adequate represen-
tation means that a union already on the council has more than 50% of the membership of the workers 
in the same area of jurisdiction. /d. 
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process.207 The severity of this measure is tempered by the 1979 Act, though, 
which permits an unsuccessful applicant to bring a claim of unfair labor practice 
in the Industrial Court within thirty days of a veto. 20B 
3. The Closed Shop 
The recent legislation has also had an impact on the long-standing practice 
of using closed shop agreements to deny blacks access to certain jobs. 
The 1956 Labour Relations Act permitted closed shop agreements between 
trade unions and employers, whereby the employer agreed not to hire any 
worker who was not a member of the negotiating union.209 Prior to 1979, this 
practice was exercised to exclude blacks from certain industries or skilled po-
sitions, because blacks were not permitted to negotiate through registered trade 
unions. 210 In 1979, the legislature suspended the formation of any further closed 
shop provisions subject to an investigation by the Manpower Commission.211 
The Commission found that such agreements could be generally useful.212 
Because references to race, sex, or color were removed from the Labour Re-
lations Act by the 1981 Act,213 some of the occasions for misuse were eliminated. 
In 1982, the government further protected against abuse by permitting a newly 
hired, non-union worker a ninety day grace period within which to join the 
appropriate union. 214 
4. The Option of the Strike 
One effect of the recent labor legislation is to create a legitimate strike option 
for black workers. There are a variety of demands by South African blacks that 
prompt the desire to strike: poor working conditions, unresponsive manage-
ment, limited job mobility, and an inability to negotiate recognition agree-
ments. 215 Most strikes, however, are prompted solely by economic concerns.216 
207Id. § 21(A). 
208 SOUTH AFRICA 1984. supra note 49, at 467. 
209Id. 
210Id. at 452. 
211 Id. at 468. 
212/d. at 462. Closed shop provisions are thought to help promote industrial peace and stable 
industrial relations, by assuring that union gains are not undercut by the employment of outsiders. 
/d. 
21' Id. at 468. 
214 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1982 STAT. S. AFR. No. 51, § 24(1)(x). 
215 Marsh, supra note 22, at 50. 
216 Wall SI. j., July 29, 1982, at 23, col. 2. See also Schlemmer, Build-up to Revolution or Impasse, 18 j. 
ASIAN & AFRICAN STUD. 60, 73-74 (1983). A wave of strikes in 1982 was prompted by the government's 
policy in handling workers' pension contributions and benefits. Id. 
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In fact, partly because of the high inflation rate, one-half of all strikes are a 
result of dissatisfaction with wages.2I7 
Whatever the specific reasons that prompt strikes, it is clear that they are 
becoming more common. In 1979, blacks participated in 101 strikes and work 
stoppages.218 The number more than doubled the next year, when there were 
207 strikes.2I9 In 1981 the number rose to 342;220 in 1982 there were 394 
strikes.221 Along with rapid rate of growth, the success of such strikes has 
improved as well. Collective bargaining agreements have been reached in all 
industrial sectors, often outside the machinery established by the government. 222 
Unions are also winning recognition agreements and wage increases with more 
frequency.223 
Until 1973, blacks were prevented from striking by the Black Labour Relations 
Regulation Act of 1953. 224 After the Durban strikes, however, the government 
passed the Black Labour Relations Amendment Act of 1973,225 thereby making 
strikes by blacks legal as long as rigid guidelines are followed. 226 
The 1979 Act eliminates the requirements of the 1973 legislation by bringing 
blacks under the restrictions of the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act. 227 Before 
any strike is allowed, the dispute must be referred to the Industrial Council.228 
If there has been a thirty day cooling-off period, certain strikes may become 
permissible.229 If there has been a Wage Act determination, the cooling-off 
period becomes one year. 230 
If there is no Industrial Council, the union must request a conciliation board 
determination,231 and report the dispute to the Minister. 232 If such a board is 
not set up by the Minister within thirty days of the request, or the board has 
existed for a thirty day cooling-off period, then the strike is permissible.233 If 
217 Wall St. j., July 29, 1982, at 23, col. 2. 
218 Wall St. j., Dec. 10, 1981, at 35, col. 2. 
219 Wall St. j., Aug. 17, 1981, at 18, col. I. 
220 Christian Science Monitor, July 21,1982, at 9, col. I. 
221 Christian Science Monitor, April 19, 1983, at 3, col. I. FOSATU affiliates were involved in over 
60% of the strikes occuring in 1982. SOUTH AFRICA 1984. supra note 49, at 471. 
222 Marsh, supra note 22, at 51. 
223 [d. It should be noted, however, that three-quarters of all strikes by new unions are lost through 
mass firings and selective rehiring. See N.Y. Times, Aug. I, 1982, at I, col. 3. 
224 Black Labour Relations Regulation Act, 1953 STAT. S. AFR. No. 48. 
225 Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act, 1973 STAT. S. AFR. No. 70. 
226 [d. See generally Gould, Unions, supra note II, at 719. 
227 Industrial Conciliation Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94. 
228 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 65(I)(d)(i). 
229 !d. 
230 !d. § 65(l)(b). 
231 [d. 65(1)(d)(ii). 
232 !d. 
233 [d. 
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the constitution of the Industrial Council provides for compulsory arbitration, 
however, a strike may never be legal. 234 
If a board is successfully implemented, there are still a variety of prerequisites 
to the right to strike. Sympathy strikes and political strikes are illegal, for 
example.235 A strike is also impermissible unless there is a majority decision of 
all union members by ballot.236 A strike is prohibited during the term of an 
existing industrial council agreement if the strike is related to the matters 
provided for in the agreement. 237 Finally, strikes are entirely illegal in the 
essential services.238 
These restrictions are made even more rigid by the Labour Relations Amend-
ment Act of 1981.239 Trade unions are prohibited by the Act from granting 
strike assistance to workers involved in illegal strikes.240 Moreover, the fine for 
participation in such a strike is raised to RlOOO or one year in prison.24 ! The 
1981 legislation also requires that any discontinuance of work must be reported 
to the Department of Manpower by the employer.242 Few of the strikes within 
the past five years have met the requirements of South African law.243 From a 
practical standpoint, however, the differences between legal and illegal strikes 
have become almost academic. Most strikes since 1979 have been illegal, but the 
large numbers of strikers involved has made prosecution impracticaJ.244 
5. Job Reservation 
Section 77 of the Labour Relations Act of 1956 mandated that certain cate-
gories of work be open only to whites.245 South African firms, however, have 
recently experienced a shortage of skilled white labor.246 There is not a sufficient 
pool of skilled black workers and managers from which to fill the vacancies, 
234 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 452. 
235 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No.28, §§ 65(IA). 
236 [d. § 65(2). 
237 [d. § 65(I)(a). 
238 !d. § 65(l)(c). Essential services include power, water, sanitation, passenger transportation, and 
fire protection. 
239 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57. 
240 [d. § 65(3A). Strike assistance in this context includes both financial assistance and general aid 
toward the commission of an illegal strike. [d. 
24! !d. § 82(l)(b). 
'4'[d. § 65A. 
243 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 473. But see infra note 359 and accompanying text. 
244 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 473. The government has also avoided prosecution for 
fear that such action would increase labor tension. Wall St. J., July 29, 1982, at 23, col. 2. 
245 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 77. 
246 Bus. WK., June 18, 1979, at 130. There has been an exodus of skilled and professional whites 
from South Africa. See Gould, Unions, supra note II, at 718. 
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because blacks have been forced into the unskilled and semi-skilled classes.247 
Accordingly, productivity has suffered.248 Responding to the recommendations 
of the Wiehahn Commission, therefore, the 1979 Industrial Conciliation 
Amendment Act repealed section 77.249 Those reservations already in existence 
were permitted to be retained.250 However, on December 1, 1979, three of the 
remaining five reservations were cancelled by the Minister. 251 One more was 
cancelled in February, 1982, leaving only the reservation concerning certain 
mining occupations. 252 
6. Political Prohibitions 
Another change brought about by the recent legislation is a tightening of the 
requirement that registered unions be apolitical. Originally, the Labour Rela-
tions Act of 1956 prohibited the registration of unions that affiliated with any 
political party or gave financial or other assistance to a political party or its 
candidates. 253 Political party is defined as "any association or group" which has 
as one objective "1) the nomination of candidates for election to Parliament or 
to any provincial councilor local authority, or 2) the influencing of public 
opinion to support or to oppose any such association or group."254 The 1979 
Act extends the definition of political party to include any association with one 
of its objects being the nomination of candidates for election to "any legislative 
body established by any law."255 The 1981 Act further restricted the political 
aspirations of registered unions by extending the definition of political activity 
to include giving any assistance or "carrying on activities or influence or endea-
vour to influence its members" with the object of assisting a political party or a 
candidate for election.256 
Some commentators have indicated that one reason for the passage of the 
recent changes is to submit black unions to direct governmental control. 257 The 
247 In 1981, it was estimated that only 0.2% of black workers are in management positions. Projections 
showed that by the year 2000, if South Africa continued to rely solely on white managers, 50% of 
whites would have to qualify for these positions. Since two-thirds of whites now work in the public 
sector, this appears highly unrealistic. See South Africa'S Need for More Black Managers, Bus. WK., June 
8, 1981, at 78. 
248 South Africa's Need for More Black Managers, supra note 247, at 78. 
249 Industrial Conciliation Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 17. 
250 See SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 461. 
251Id. 
252Id. See infra notes 346-50 and accompanying text. 
253 Labour Relations Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 28, § 8(6). 
254/d. § 8(7). 
255 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 8(7). 
256 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57, § 8(6)(d). 
257 See, e.g., NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 1983, at 11, 12. 
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government desires to prevent black Unions from increasing their affiliation 
with the black political underground.258 
The question of whether to register poses a dilemma for black unions because 
of the requirements of apoliticism. If they choose to register and avoid political 
activism, there is a danger that the rank-and-file workers will not be satisfied.259 
Political unions, on the other hand, can refuse to register, but are then closely 
monitored by the state police.260 These political unions include SAAWU, 
MACWUSA, and the African Food and Canning Workers Union. 261 
Despite the possibility of state repression, certain unions have engaged in 
overt political actions. Certain black unions lobbied successfully against pro-
posed legislation that would have increased restrictions on black migration.262 
Another example of political activity by black unions was the campaign in 1982 
against government efforts to lock in pension benefits until retirement. 263 Black 
workers wanted funds available in the event of unemployment. 264 
When Dr. Neil Aggett, a white union leader, was found dead in prison in 
February, 1982, a nationwide half hour work stoppage was held by 100,000 
black workers to protest the detention system.265 Recently, black trade unions 
unanimously opposed the introduction of the new South African Constitu-
tion. 266 Moreover, the November 1984 general strike, discussed earlier, had 
certain political overtones. 267 Such political activism may raise the consciousness 
of the black worker, but also increases the likelihood of further government 
intervention into the trade union process. 
7. New Bodies 
The recent legislation also created two major bodies to deal with the newly 
reorganized labor system: the National Manpower Commission and the Indus-
trial Court. 
258 See, e.g., Washington Post. Nov. 27, 1982, at 23, col. I. 
259 See generally Lacob, supra note 13. 
260 NY Times, Aug. 10. 1981, at 3, col. 3. The statutory prohibition against political activities 
embodied in the 1979 legislation does not apply to unions choosing not to register. G. CARTER, supra 
note 9, at 95. Political unions are subject to the surveillance of the Department of National Security. 
See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
261 N.Y. Times,june 28,1981, at 3, col. 2. See infra notes 334-39 and accompanying text. 
262 The defeated legislation was the Orderly Movement of Black Persons Bill; one of the so-called 
Koornhoff Amendments. See Wall St. j., june 20, 1984, at 35, col. 2. 
263 Wall St. j., july 29,1982, at 23, col. 2. 
264Id. 
265 See NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 1983, at 11, 13. 
266 O'Meara, supra note 25, at 107. See also supra note 66. 
267 See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. 
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a. National Manpower Commission 
The 1979 legislation created a National Manpower Commission to act as a 
watchdog over the newly enacted trade union system.268 The Commission, es-
tablished on November I, 1979,269 consists of members representing employers, 
unionists, and the government.270 The Commission has four primary functions: 
1) giving advice to the Minister of Manpower; 2) monitoring and evaluating 
developments in the labor field; 3) researching a variety of labor matters; and 
4) reporting on labor matters on an annual and ad hoc basis.271 
b. Industrial Court 
Section 17 of the 1979 Act also established an Industrial Court.272 The Court, 
inaugurated on December I, 1979,273 is empowered to hear disputes arising out 
of laws administered by the Department of Labour, as well as disputes between 
two parties regarding their interest. The Court was created to interpret labor 
laws and regulations, hear cases of irregular and undesirable labor practices, 
and generally pronounce upon legal questions arising from the industrial re-
lations system.274 The Court may issue subpoenas, employ its own rules of 
procedure, and make law.275 In effect, the Industrial Court is both a court of 
law and an administrative tribunal. 276 
The Court has jurisdiction over non-criminal matters arising out of the labor 
statutes, including allegations of unfair labor practices.277 The 1982 Labour 
Relations Amendment Act also transferred the power to grant Status Quo orders 
from the Minister of Manpower to the Industrial Court.278 This empowered the 
Court to order the reinstatement of employees, the restoration of previous 
conditions of employment, or the abstention from an unfair labor practice, until 
the dispute is investigated or settled by an industrial council.279 The Court has 
heard an increasing number of allegations of unfair labor practices brought by 
268 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 2(A). 
269 C. HILL, CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA 104 (1983). 
270 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 2(A). See also Gould, supra 
note 8, at 133. 
271 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. § 2D. 
272 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 17. The Industrial Court 
was created by restructuring the Industrial Tribunal of the 1956 Labour Relations Act. /d. 
273 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 461. 
274 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 17(11). 
275 [d. §§ 17(17)(a), 17(22)(c). 
276 See generally C. HILL, supra note 269, at 104-07. 
277 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 17(II)(b). 
278/d. § 43. 
279/d. An industrial council dispute arising over an alleged unfair labor practice must be referred 
to the Court if the deadlock is not broken withil' 30 days. [d. § 46(9)(a). 
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black unionists accompanied by applications for Status QUO. 280 Most such cases 
deal with charges of unfair dismissals, but the Court has also ruled against 
employers who have reneged on promises to recognize a representative union.281 
In addition, the Court is empowered to hear appeals from a veto of admission 
to an industrial council.282 
8. Governmental Controls 
Apart from restrictions on political activities,283 registration under the recent 
legislation entails submission to other governmental controls. Even unregistered 
unions face various controls. This Comment will discuss the more prominent 
of these requirements, in order to portray the context in which the recent labor 
legislation acts, and the confines in which the union movement must operate. 
The 1979 Act retained provisions from the 1956 Labour Relations Regulation 
Act requiring unions to submit records and financial statements, and extended 
them to all population groups.284 The 1981 Act required even unregistered 
unions to submit constitutions and membership lists to the Department of 
Manpower.285 In 1981, the legislature also introduced the requirement that the 
head office of each union be located within the Republic. 286 
Certain governmental controls and actions predate the recent legislation, but 
continue to be relevant. One focus of government activity has been strike-
breaking. Striking workers have, on occasion, been deported to their homelands 
under the guise of the Group Areas Act. 287 The government has also distributed 
a strike-breaking pamphlet to businesses,288 and has established a fund in some 
instances to pay workers refusing to strike.289 At the state-run Sasol oil-from-
gas plant, 6000 strikers lost their jobs because of their involvement in the 
November 1984 strike. 290 
The South African police also use a variety of internal security laws to chill 
black union activity.291 The government has used the Internal Security Amend-
280 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 474. 
281 !d. 
282 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act. 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 21A. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 253-56. 
284 Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 94, § 4(1). 
285 Labour Relations Amendment Act, 1981 STAT. S. AFR. No. 57, § 4A. 
286 !d. § 11(4). 
287 Group Areas Act, 1966 STAT. S. AFR. No. 36. See supra notes 262-67 and accompanying text 
(discussion on the political activities of unions). 
288 N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1981, at 3, col. 3. 
289 Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 9, 1982, at 2, col. 2. 
290 Boesak, supra note 1, at 7. 
291 Gould, supra note 8, at 112. Security police searched FOSATU offices after the November, 1984 
strike. See Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 13, 1984, at 15, col.!. 
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ment Act292 to ban union leaders on several occasions,293 and the Black [Urban 
Areas] Consolidation Act294 still prohibits any undesirable meeting of blacks.295 
Union activity can also be repressed by the Internal Security Act. 296 The Act, 
among other things, prohibits the utterance of words or the performance of 
any act with intent "to cause, encourage or foment feelings of hostility between 
different population groups."297 Clearly, this can be used to control the more 
political trade unions. This statute also empowers officials to prohibit any gath-
ering which they feel might lead to feelings of hostility between the races. 29B In 
addition, any person who advises others to "protest against any law or in support 
of any campaign for the repeal or modification of any law" is guilty of subver-
sion, and is subject to imprisonment.299 These examples, although not exhaus-
tive, indicate the extent of the laws which have been applied to hinder the black 
trade union movement. 300 
D. Resulting Growth of Unions 
The recent legislation has provided a spark for the growth of the trade union 
movement. There are, of course, other reasons for the growth. The problem 
of depressed wages is one primary reason for the surge in black union growth 
in recent years. Other motivating factors include: poor working conditions, 
ineffective or nonresponsive management, housing shortages, increased rents 
and utility bills, and rising bus fares.:lDl Part of the strength of the black union 
movement can also be attributed to intelligent planning by the unions them-
selves. One problem of past efforts was that unions were quickly formed on a 
nationwide basis, with little unification and limited funds for effective organ i-
zation.302 In contrast, the current policy is to gain solid membership in one 
factory before recruiting from the next.303 The grassroots movement has created 
a strong factory base and a well-developed shop steward structure.304 
292 Internal Security Amendment Act, 1979 STAT. S. AFR. No. 79. 
293 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
29' Black [Urban Areas] Consolidation Act, 1944 STAT. S. AFR. No. 25. 
295 !d. § 9(7). 
296 Internal Security Act, 1982 STAT. S. AFR. No. 74. 
297Id. § 62. 
29BId. § 47. 
299Id. § 59. 
300 Recent examples of governmental controls that may peripherally affect trade unions include the 
clampdown on media coverage and the state of emergency imposed on various districts of South 
Africa. Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1985, at 13, col. 12. The state of emergency was 
imposed by the government onJuly 21,1985, in an effort to curtail unrest, and on November 2,1985, 
South Africa prohibited the televising, photographing, recording or drawing of an unrest in areas 
affected by an emergency decree, except with the permission of the commissioner of the police. Id. 
301 Marsh, supra note 22, at 50. 
302 Kane-Berman, Black Unions Start Winning, NEW STATESMAN, Jan. 15, 1982, at 10. 
303Id. 
304 See Kane-Berman, supra note 302, at 10; Gould, supra note 8, at 121, 127. Because black unions 
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The increase in the membership of unions over the past few years has been 
dramatic. In 1980, there were an estimated 80,000 members of blacks unions, 
comprising less than one percent of the workforce. 305 By 1985, the black union 
movement had grown to over 700,000 members.306 This figure, which does not 
include members of unregistered black unions, represents five percent of the 
workforce. 3D? The number in the industrial sector is even higher, approaching 
ten percent. 308 Blacks now comprise forty-three percent of total union strength; 
thirty-four percent of union members are whites, and twenty-three percent are 
Indian or of mixed race.309 
Not all black trade unionists, however, share the same philosophies and desire 
the same goals. The question of how politically active a particular union is to 
be has created certain problems. 310 Although most unions have avoided overt 
political stands, rank-and-file members often demand a more militant policy.311 
Thus, questions over whether to register, whether to strike, and whether to 
focus on narrow shop floor questions to the exclusion of broader labor issues 
have often resulted in some divisiveness. A brief survey of the major unions 
and confederations will highlight responses to the recent labor legislation. In 
particular, the actions of certain of these unions will demonstrate how black 
labor has used its new-found statutory legitimacy to gain leverage toward further 
political and social gains. 
1. Non-Political Unions 
Although it is difficult to document a black trade union in South Africa that 
does not display certain political tendencies, there is a dichotomy between those 
unions which are generally non-political, and those which are overtly political.312 
Three union confederations which fall into the first category are the Federation 
of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), the Council of Unions of South 
Africa (CUSA), and the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). 
The first of these, FOSATU, is one of the largest and most influential black 
organizations in South Africa.313 Formed in 1979, FOSATU has grown in mem-
have long been excluded from the industrial council system, they have been compelled to organize 
and negotiate at the plant level. I d. at 127. 
'05 Gould, supra note 8, at 117. 
'06 As South Africa'S Whites Keep Iron Grip on Power, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 13, 1985, at 
40. 
,o7 New Republic, Aug. 1, 1983, at 13. 
'08 Lacob, supra note 13, at 684. 
'09 Russell, supra note I, at 23. 
'10 See supra notes accompanying notes 262-67 (discussion on the political activities of unions). 
3ll See Lacob, supra note 13, at 685; Bus. WK., Feb. 25, 1980, at 160. 
m See generally SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 471-73. 
'" See Gould, supra note 8, at 121. 
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bership from 16,000 to 150,000 trade unionists.Sl4 Initially, FOSATU took a 
militant stand, and the government responded by invoking the Fund Raising 
Act,315 which prohibited the federation from receiving certain funds. 316 More 
recently, however, FOSATU has generally avoided overt political stands to 
commit itself to building strength through plant level organization and shop 
steward structure.317 All FOSATU unions have registered,318 and they espouse 
multiracial membership.3i9 In general, FOSATU-organized strikes have focused 
on wages and recognition,320 even though most such strikes were technically 
illegaJ.32l FOSATU's key involvement in the November 1984 strikes indicates, 
however, that the platform of the organization may be becoming more politi-
cal.322 The approach of FOSATU has influenced other independent trade 
unions, notably the General Workers Union (GWU) and the Food and Canning 
Workers Union (FCWU).323 
Like FOSATU, the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) has enjoyed 
rapid growth. Since its formation in September 1980, CUSA's membership has 
grown from 29,000 to 160,000.324 CUSA shares the philosophy of FOSATU 
regarding the desirability of registration and the necessity of avoiding political 
314 Boesak, supra note I, at 7; Wall St. j., June 20, 1984, at 35, col. 2. See generally SOUTH AFRICA 
1984, supra note 49, at 471-73. 
m Fund Raising Act, 1978 STAT. S. AFR. No. 107. 
316Id. § II. Only authorized uses of funds are allowed. 
317 Gould, supra note 8, at 121. 
318 Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 3, 1982, at 4, col. I. 
319 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 471. The existence of some white leaders in FOSATU 
unions has resulted in some dissent among rank-and-file workers. See Lacob, supra note 13, at 685. 
FOSATU is committed to non-racial trade unionism, although its membership is predominantly black. 
Id. 
320 Lacob, supra note 13, at 685. 
:"1 See discussion regarding the option of the strike supra notes 215-44 and accompanying text. 
'" Boesak, supra note I, at 7. FOSATU is one of the largest of the 36 independent black unions that 
united on December I, 1985 to form the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 
Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1985, at I, col. I. This new federation is composed of 
500,000 members, and is led by newly-elected President Elijah Barayi. Christian Science Monitor, 
December 6, 1985, at 21, col. I. COSATU is a result of a merger between those unions focusing on 
highly organized factories and those with more political goals. Christian Science Monitor, November 
29, 1985, at I, col. I. The federation, however, is based on a nonracial philosophy, and has excluded 
those unions which do not permit white membership. N.Y. Times, December I, 1985, at I, col. 3. In 
addition, the federation is founded on the principle of one union per industry. This will result in the 
eventual elimination of certain general unions, including the South African Allied Workers Union 
and the General and Allied Workers Union. Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1985, at I, col. I. 
COSATU has made it clear from its inception that it will openly advocate political change in South 
Africa. Declarations of Defiance, TIME, December 16, 1985, at 36. Specifically, the federation has called 
for foreign divestment, nationalization of major industries, the release of Nelson Mandela, the jailed 
A.N.C. leader, the withdrawal of government troops from black townships, and the revocation of 
influx control measures. Id. 
323 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 472. 
324 Wall St.j.,June 20,1984, at 35, col. 2. 
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challenges to focus on the issues of wages and recognition.325 CUSA was also 
involved in the November 1984 general strike.326 Unlike its sister alliance, how-
ever, CUSA has all-black leadership,327 and supports the idea that unions can 
exist without being integrated.328 
One of the largest labor federations in South Africa, the Trade Union Council 
of South Africa (TUCSA), is multiracial.329 However, as mentioned, TUCSA 
has changed its position several times regarding the membership of black 
unions.33o Subsequently, the federation developed a predominantly white mem-
bership.331 The fact that TUCSA has historically organized closed shop agree-
ments has further distanced most black unions. 332 The National Clothing Work-
ers Union and the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions are, however, 
affiliated with TUCSA and enjoy some autonomy.333 
2. Political Unions 
As noted, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was banned 
in the 1960s for its links to the African National Congress and the South African 
Communist Party.334 The legacy of SACTU, though, has been continued by 
such unions as the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the 
Motor Assemblers and Component Workers Union of South Africa 
(MACWUSA). The police have kept a close watch on SAAWU335 and have 
arrested the I!!adership of this unregistered union on several occasions.336 Never-
theless, SAAWU still openly voices political grievances.337 MACWUSA has met 
similar state scrutiny; its President, Dumile Makanda, spent 271 days in deten-
tion before being banned.338 MACWUSA has been particularly vocal in its 
325 Lacob. supra note 13. at 685. 
326 Christian Science Monitor. Nov. 16. 1984. at 14. col. 1. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5. 
327 Lacob. supra note 13. at 685. 
328 SOUTH AFRICA 1984. supra note 49. at 472. 
329 Wall St. J.. June 20. 1984. at 35. col. 2. 
330 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
331 Wall St. J.. June 20. 1984. at 35. col. 2. 
332 Id. 
333 Gould. supra note 8. at 122. 
334 See supra text accompanying notes 47-48. Barrell. supra note 47. at 953; Marsh. supra note 22. at 
52; Gould. supra note 8. at 104. 
335 N.Y. Times. Aug. 1. 1982. at 1. col. 3. 
3361d. 
337 SAAWU led political opposition to the proposed independence of Ciskei. See A Fast Rise for South 
Africa's Black UnioTlS. Bus. WK .• October 19. 1981. at 110; N.V. Times. June 28.1981. at 3. col. 3. 
338 N.Y. Times. Aug. I. 1982. at I. col. 3. MACWUSA's sister organization. the General Workers 
Union of South Africa (GWUOSA). is another of the more militant unions. SOUTH AFRICA 1984. supra 
note 49. at 473. For a discussion of what it means to be banned. see supra note 48. 
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opposition to the Sullivan Principles, calling them "a toothless package" and a 
"piecemeal reform" that allows for the the perpetuation of apartheid.339 
VI. THE SPECIAL CASE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY 
Before concluding, this Comment will examine the special case of the mining 
industry. There are two reasons why this particular sector of the economy merits 
special consideration. First, although the labor legislation affecting the mining 
industry has been subjected to recent pressures and changes, it has developed 
separately from that of other industries. Second, the experience of black mining 
unions serves as a good example of how black pressure has led to legislative 
change, which in turn has led to further pressure. 
Historically, the mining industry has been more resistant to black labor ad-
vances than any other. 340 The legislation regarding mines has developed sepa-
rately from the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act, and derives primarily from 
the Mines and Works Act of 1956.34l In both coal and gold mines, black unions 
in the past have been extremely weak.342 The labor conditions confronting the 
black miner are so poor, however, that the potential power of unions has always 
been attractive. 
Wages have been particularly low in the mining industry. Even though the 
pay has increased substantially over the past decade, the wage gap between 
black and white miners has grown wider. 343 
Another problem facing black miners concerns the health and safety condi-
tions of the mines. From 1972 to 1982, 8209 miners were killed, and in 1983, 
the Hlobane colliery explosion took sixty-four lives and received international 
attention.344 Upon investigation, the International Mineworkers Federation de-
termined that the explosion probably resulted from a series of neglected safety 
checks, and that, in general, South African collieries were six times more dan-
gerous than those in Great Britain.345 
Perhaps the most caustic of all issues, however, is the system of job reservations 
that limits blacks to inferior, lower paying positions.346 The Mines and Works 
339 Davis, Cason & Hovey, supra note 25, at 552. 
",0 Christian Science Monitor, June 10, 1983, at 12, col. I. 
341 Mines and Works Act, 1956 STAT. S. AFR. No. 27. 
3'12 See generally South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27. The African Mineworkers Union 
did gain a considerable following in the 1940s, but the state used the military to repress strike activities. 
See discussion supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. See also Gould, supra note 8, at 103. 
'·13 In the early 1970s, the average white miner made twenty times more than the average black 
miner. Today, the ratio has dropped to 5.5: I, but the average black wage of R286 per month is barely 
at the subsistence level. See South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at I. 
'44Id. at 2. 
34S Id. The National Union of Mineworkers has subsequently supported any member refusing to 
work because of suspected unsafe conditions. Id. 
'46 Christian Science Monitor, June 10, 1983, at 12, col. I. 
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Act reserves thirteen key occupations, including blasting and cage supervision, 
to whites. 347 The number of white miners in these key positions has declined 
thirty-seven percent since 1960, and it is evident that production will stagnate 
unless blacks are admitted into skilled positions.348 The final report of the 
Wiehahn Commission, in fact, recommended that all forms of job reservations 
be abolished in mines.349 The powerful white Mineworkers Union, however, has 
vehemently opposed repeal of the Mines and Works Act, and has threatened 
to strike if the Wiehahn proposals are enacted.350 
The Chamber of Mines granted access to unions wishing to organize black 
miners in 1982,351 and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was founded 
in October of that year. 352 Since that time, the NUM has become the largest and 
most influential of the black mining movements.353 The NUM has grown to 
110,000 members in twenty-three mines,354 and has won recognition in eight 
gold mines and five collieries.355 Affiliated with CUSA, the NUM has been 
involved in unprecedented negotiations with the Chamber of Mines. 356 The 
NUM, considered relatively moderate, has focused on the development of local 
organization through shaft stewards and the recruitment of members in com-
pany-owned living compounds.357 It has avoided most political issues to concen-
trate on wages and health and safety issues. 358 
On September 16, 1984, the NUM declared the first legal strike in mining 
history.359 The strike option was considered after negotiation with the Chamber 
347 Undermining the Mines, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1981, at 76. 
348 Wall St. J., Dec. 10, 1981, at 35, col. 2. 
349 [d. The government accepted, in principle, the goal of ending job reservations in the mines, but 
has left the matter for the mining companies to work out. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22, 1985, 
at 10, col. 4. 
350 Undermining the Mines, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1981, at 76. 
351 SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 477. 
352 Black Miners Drive a Wedge into Apartheid, Bus. WK., May 2, 1983, at 46. 
353 Of 428,000 blacks working in gold mines and 56,000 working in coal mines, the NUM claims a 
recruitment rate of 5,000 per month. See South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 2. As 
recently as two years ago, the NUM boasted only 12,000 members. See L.A. Times, June 19, 1983, 
sect. IV, at 2, col. 2. 
354 Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22, 1985, at 9, col. 4. 
355 South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 1. 
356 [d. The Chamber of Mines is an employer organization accounting for 85% of the production 
and employment in the mining sector. SOUTH AFRICA 1984, supra note 49, at 476. One function of the 
Chamber is the negotiation of conditions of employment with recognized trade unions. The terms of 
such agreements are used as standards throughout the industry. [d. 
357 South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 1. The NUM decided at a recent conference 
to register with the government. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22, 1985, at 9, col. 4. In addition, 
the NUM has joined the newly-formed federation, COSATU. N.Y. Times, December I, 1985, at I, 
col. 1. See supra note 322 (discussion of COSATU). 
358 South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 1. 
359 The disturbances began on June 21,1984, when the white Chamber of Mines decided to forego 
further wage negotiations with the NUM and to declare an industry-wide pay increase. See South 
Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 1; Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22, 1985, at 9, col. 4. 
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of Mines regarding wages proved futile. 360 The strike, however, turned violent, 
and led to illegal wildcat strikes.36 ! Nevertheless, the NUM won wage conces-
sions, and emerged from the strike with renewed confidence. 362 The growth 
and power of the NUM has surprised the Chamber of Mines, and has caused 
a split in the ranks of white management. Some managers feel that the NUM 
should be checked while it is still fairly young, while others believe that the 
union should be allowed to carryon its recruitment unhindered. 363 Since most 
managers feel that negotiations with a union are preferable to mob violence, 
the future of the NUM appears promising. 364 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There can be little doubt that the black labor movement in South Africa has 
gained leverage. The size and number of black unions have increased propor-
tionately with the successes of these unions on matters of wages and recognition. 
For the first time, the organization of blacks has been accepted by both business 
and government. 
The recently enacted legislation can be seen as an experiment in social ac-
commodation; benevolent reforms that can be easily repealed if unions become 
too unruly. Certainly the checks on the black unions are substantial, and the 
right to strike is severely hampered by the legislation. A registered black union 
can be more easily monitored for signs of political activism, and the state has 
an array of internal security measures available with which to punish noncon-
forming unions. 
If the legislation were seen only in this light, any chance for true change 
within the labor system would be quite remote. If the reforms were simply 
paternalistic measures that could easily be revoked, then unions would be des-
tined to be eternally fragile. It is clear, however, that the motivation for the 
recent legislation has little to do with good will. 
The reason for the accommodation of black unions is not benevolence, but 
necessity. The government has recognized that the workplace functions far more 
efficiently when businesses can negotiate with organized unions rather than with 
violent mobs. Pragmatism has led businessmen to accept unions, and may thus 
act to preserve these unions. 
360 Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 22, 1985, at 9, col. 4. 
361Id. 
362Id. Action by the National Union of Mineworkers in September 1985 was not so successful, 
however, as a strike was suspended when mining companies threatened to dismiss and evict the workers 
from their hostels. N.V. Times, September 6, 1985, at 8, col. 1. 
363 South Africa: The Miner's Cauldron, supra note 27, at 1. 
364Id. 
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The black unions, once recognized as economically necessary, are far more 
stable and, in turn, more powerful. A repeal of the legislation would not only 
hinder black labor in the short-term, but would be detrimental to the long-term 
success and growth of the South African economy. 
Other business considerations make up another major reason for the growing 
black labor movement. It has become an economic necessity that blacks be 
trained and recruited for more advanced positions because of the shortage of 
skilled white labor. The economy would not be able to function effectively 
without an increase in the number of skilled black workers. 
A black worker, active in a recognized union and employed in a skilled 
position, is in an excellent bargaining position. Any adverse government action 
could lead to both economic disaster and eventual mob violence. 
It is likely that the newly enlightened black unions will not be satisfied with 
changes in industrial law; political activism is sure to follow. It is also likely that 
the initial government response will be one of police and military repression. 
The leverage gained by the black union movement, however, will eventually 
cause the South African regime to realize that it faces a choice: either accom-
modate black demands and gradually dismantle apartheid, or resist and precip-
itate violent revolution. 
Mark Wiseman 
